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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

FUSTLER LODGE and STATE
INS UPANCE FUND,

)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,)

CASE NO.

)
)

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and RAYEL JENSEN,

}
)
}
}

Defendants-Respondents)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This case is an appeal from an order by the Industrial
Co~ission

reversing the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

and Order of the Administrative Law Judge.
DISPOSITION BY TilE UTAH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Administrative Law Judge ruled that the applicant
was not entitled to Horkmens Compensation benefits as against the
Rustler Lodge and its insurance carrier, State Insurance Fund.
This ruling was reversed by the Industrial Commission which held
mat the applicant was an employee of Rustler Lodge, rather than

m independent contractor, as required by 35-1-42, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the order made
by the Industrial Commission and an affirmation of the order of
the Administrative Law Judge.
ABBREVIATIONS
As used herein, "Tr." followed by a number refers to
the transcript of the Industrial Commission hearing and its page
number.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The applicant herein, on June 21, 1974, tripped and
fell on a stairway lvhile working at the Rustler Lodge at Alta,
Utah.

(Tr. 15)

His left shoulder 'N"as dislocated and his right

knee was injured to an extent requiring surgery.

(Tr.

15, 16

and 18)
At the time, applicant was a skilled drywall applicator
who generally operates a business with an associate, David Wagstaff,
under the name Triangle Dry 'tlall.

(Tr.

3, 4)

The first contact

made by the manager of the Lodge, to get this particular job done,
was with the applicant's associate, Hr. Wagstaff.

(Tr. 5)

I t was

indicated that Triangle was probably not interested, as a company,
in the job, but the applicant himself might handle it.
contacted Mr. Jensen.

(Tr. 6 and 34)

The manager

After this point, Mr. Larry

Thompson handled the negotiations and arrangements on behalf of
the Lodge.

(Tr.

6)
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The job in question consisted of applying some sheetrock
in a storage area and in the ceiling of a conference room.

(Tr. 7)

The applicant made several inspection trips to the Lodge in order
to

estimate the materials necessary for the job, etc.

(Tr. ll)

Applicant was to furnish said materials but they were to be paid
for by the Lodge.

(Tr. 34)

It was also decided that applicant

v10uld be paid $8.00 per hour.

(Tr. 34)

The applicant furnished all the specialized tools involved
in the job, while the Lodge furnished a visqueen drop cloth for the
floor and a ladder.

(Tr. 24, 25)

The Lodge is in the lodging and restaurant business.
hires the usual staff of cooks, waitresses, bus boys, etc.

It

It

has an ancillary activity of maintenance which requires a maintenance
and handy man crew, but the Lodge routinely hires outside help
for repairs requiring skilled services, such as electricians,
plumbers, etc.

(Tr. 33 and 36)

There appears to be no controversy

mat the job in question required a skill not possessed by the usual
maintenance crews.

(Tr. 27 and 39)
ARGUMENT

It should be clearly understood at the outset that the
facts of this case are not really questioned by either side.

The

issue herein is largely one of establishing all the facts, then
weighing them to see which of the possible legal conclusions is
best sustained by those facts.
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Sommerville v. Industrial Commission, 113 U. 504, 196
P.2d 718,

(1948) is a case very similar to this one.

In that case

the owner of a building engaged the plaintiff and another individu,
to make repairs to the building.
compensation.

Plaintiff was injured and

sou~t

The Inuustrial Commission denied compensation and

that denial was affirmed by the Supreme Court.

The Court said,

at 719:
The question of whether or not one
engaged in a service for another is an employee
or an independent contractor, within the meaning
of the tiTorkmen' s Compensation Act, is a jurisdictional qu;stion, presenting a situation
which require'S this court to determine the
status from the facts submitted, by a preponderance of the evidence. But where, as here,
the evidence in the case is largely uncontradicted, the problem is not so much one of
examining the record to determine whether the
evidence preponderates for or against the
conclusion of the commission, but rather of
determining whether the commission drew the
correct legal conclusion therefrom.
(Citations omitted)
The Court went on to point out that the defendant owned
and operated a coffee shop.
in question.
was wanted.

The defendant also owned the building

The defendant gave an explanation as to what work
It was agreed that the defendant would furnish the

materials and pay the carpenter's union scale wage of $1.50 per
hour.

In the course of the repair work plaintiff's eye was injured.
POINT I.
THE Tt/ORK DONE BY APPLICANT \vAS NOT IN THE USUAL
COURSE OF BUSINESS CARRIED ON BY RUSTLER LODGE
AS REQUIRED BY 35-l-42, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
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Factually Sommerville, supra. is distinguishable from
our case because the building repaired was separate from the coffee
shop.

It was felt, therefore, that the repair work could not be

considered a part of defendant's "usual course" of business.

The

language cited as well as certain facts given are helpful in the
present case, and will be discussed below.
The issue of what constitutes the nature of a business
was discussed in Anderson v. Last Chance Ranch Co., 63
228 P. 184,

(1924).

u.

551,

There defendant ranch had employed a carpenter

to build a home as residence for its foreman or manager.

The

carpenter was injured not while working on the house, but while
momentarily helping other ranch hands to carry groceries.

The

Court said, at 186:
In a narrow and restricted view of the
transaction, plaintiff at the very moment of
his injury was an agricultural laborer. He
was assisting farm laborers in moving boxes
containing groceries for use on the farm.
In
the broader sense he was a carpenter's helper,
for that was the work he had been doing all the
time from the date of his employment down to
the moment he stepped aside, at the request
of his employer, to assist in removing the
boxes. We are not inclined to dispose of the
case upon the narrow view above referred to.
The Court then went on to say that the "general and usual"
business of the employer was agriculture and not building construction.
Applying this case to our facts, the Commission, in the
order reversing the Administrative Law Judge said that the fact that
the applicant was hired as a skilled drywall applicator did not
alter the maintenance situation.

Apparently, the Commission felt

that the applicant's work was in the nature of maintenance.

If
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that is true, why was it that the maintenance crew, regularly
hired by the Lodge, was not asked to do the job in question?
The answer is obvious.

That crew lacked the skill, material and

tools to accomplish the task.

They did not have these items because

the "usual course of the

business" was restaurant and overnig;:.

accommodations with some ancillary maintenance work.

The job

required something dehors the usual scope of work carried on at
the Lodge.
POINT II.
THE LODGE DID NOT SUPERVISE AND CONTROL THE HORK.
Referring to the Sommerville case, supra., it was stated
therein, at 720:
[3]
It is now well settled in the
jurisdiction that the crucial factor in
determining whether an applicant for
workmen's compensation is an employee or
an independent contractor is whether or
not the person for whom the services were
performed had the right to control the
execution of the work.
On many occasions various factors have been discussed
as aids in establishing what is meant by "right to control" work.
At least two Utah cases adopt the position taken by the Restatement
of the Law of Agency, § 220.
of Utah, 344 P.2d 538,

See Sutton v. Industrial Commission

(1959); and Christean v. Industrial CommissiJ.l!'l:

113 U. 451, 196 P.2d 502,

(1948).

Christean, supra., at 505, quotes from the Restatement:
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"(2)
In determining whether one acting for
another is.a servant or an independent contractor,
the followlng matters of fact, among others, are
considered:
"a.
The extent of control 1¥hich, by
the agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
"b. whether or not the employed is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
"c.
the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer
or by a specialist without supervision;
"d.
the skill required in the particular
occupation;
"e. whether the employer or the workman supplied the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work for the person doing the work;
"f.
the length of time for which the
person is employed;
"g.
the method of payment, whether by
the time or by the job;
"h. whether or not the work is a part
of the regular business of the employer; and
"i. whether or not the parties believe
they are creating the relationship of master
and servant."
Since no express agreement seemed to exist between the
parties subdivision a. above will be discussed later under the intent
of the parties.
Beginning with subdivision b., it is obvious from the
discussion above that the general business of the Lodge, including
its maintenance requirements, is distinct from that of the applicant
herein.

The applicant testified that the patching and texturing

required on this job was an art,

(Tr. 26) and that he was hired

for his skill at this particular art, a skill he had attained
from 21 years of experience.

(Tr. 27)

This indicates the distinction
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"contracting" rather than entering into a master servant relationship.

(Tr. 37)

Further, the Lodge took advice from people in

similar circumstances,
applicant.

(Tr. 36)

(Tr. 39)

and they

took advice from the

Finally, the manager testified that when he

hires professional help, such as electricians, plumbers, etc. that
he does not consider them employees, nor does he withhold taxes,
even when he does pay them by the hour.

(Tr. 42-43)

CONCLUSION
It can be seen by following a step by step process
through the Restatement that in every instance, the evidence
preponderates against finding a master-servant relationship in
this case.

As a result, no compensation can be paid to the applica:.:

because he \vas not an employee or servant as required by 35-1-42,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

It is respectfully submitted that ilie

Industrial Commission misconstrued the facts herein.
the wrong legal conclusion was drawn.

As a result

The Commission should be

reversed and the order of the Administrative Law Judge should be
affirmed.
DATED this _____ day of August, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT D. !100RE
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Rawlings, Roberts & Black
400 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
328-9741
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